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RESUMEN: La Consulta Ética Clínica es una actividad relativamente 
nueva en USA, como un servicio destinado a ayudar a pacientes indi-
viduales o grupos. Se describe la evolución histórica de la CEC desde 
su inicio en 1976. Entre otras funciones, la CEC presta un soporte 
moral y un “confort” psicológico a los profesionales de la salud en la 
toma de decisiones. Se describen los métodos operativos y de acceso 
a la CEC.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Consulta Ética Clínica (CEC), bioética, derechos 
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ABSTRACT: The clinical ethics consultation is a relatively new 
activity in US; a sort of service set aside for helping individual 
patients and groups. The historical evolution of CEC is described 
from the very beginning to 1976. Among other duties CEC gives 
moral support and psychological comfort to professionals related 
to health in decision-making moments. The operative methods and 
the access systems to CEC are fully described.
KEY WORDS: Clinical Ethics Consultation (CEC), bioethics, animal 
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Clinical Ethics Consultation is a relatively new activity in 
the United States. It is still in evolution and, therefore, its 
shape and impact remain somewhat ill defined. Ethics con-
sultation falls in the category of clinical ethics which itself 
may be subsumed under the broader category of bioethics. 
Bioethics deals with moral dimensions of bioscience, inclu-
ding topics ranging from scientific misconduct and animal 
rights to distributive justice in health care. One of the more 
focused areas included in bioethics is clinical ethics, an area 
that considers the moral dimensions of the provision of 
clinical care. It could include such subjects as truthtelling, 
confidentiality, euthanasia, applications of reproductive te-
chnology or genetic counseling. Clinical ethics consultation 
involves a specific practical application – indeed a clinical 
practice – in the realm of clinical ethics.
The recent Report of the American Society for Bioethics 
and Humanities, “Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics 
Consultation,” defined clinical ethics consultation as:
A service provided by an individual or a group to help pa-
tients, families, surrogates, health care providers, or other 
involved parties address uncertainty or conflict regarding 
value-laden issues that emerge in health care1.
The Report considered two “domains” of consultation: 1) 
clinical ethics, issues that arise in specific patient cases; 
and, 2) organization ethics, which addresses the corporate 
and business practices of health care organizations. I will 
deal here only with the first, touching briefly, if at all, on 
the newer and highly controversial issue of organizational 
ethics. First, I will trace the history of the development of 
clinical ethics consultation (CEC) in order to demonstrate 
how it was shaped by the unique scientific, social, and 
legal context in the United States in the last third of the 
20th century – especially the evolving notion of patient 
autonomy. Next I will address some special features of 
CEC:
• The competing or complementary roles CEC might be 
tempted by or pressured into;
• The proper approach. Authoritarian, pure facilitation/
mediation, or the so-called ethics facilitation model?
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• Who should have access to ethics committees (perhaps 
the most controversial issue of all).
• How is it best done. By committee, small team, or in-
dividual consultant?
I will argue that CEC must, by definition, be a practice that 
“intrudes” into clinical practice in the sense that it does 
something that was not done before that has the potential 
to affect clinical decisions and, therefore, clinical outcomes. 
How it affects clinical practice may be viewed positively or 
negatively, may be welcomed or rejected, may be effective, 
useless, or even destructive. Because of this reality, how 
CEC is practiced and received will be highly dependent on 
the particular social, political, religious, and legal context. It 
will inevitably address and effect: the nature of hierarchical 
relationships (e.g., physicians with nurses, professors with 
trainees); the control of medical information; the right and 
responsibility for medical decisions; and, the differences in 
values and expectations between the important players 
(patient, family, health professionals, institution).
It is inevitable that CEC will have a very different face, if 
it shows its face at all, in clinical cultures that are very 
different. CEC is different on surgery services than it is in 
pediatrics. The differences will be more dramatic when we 
move from different services to different communities and, 
certainly, to different countries and regions of the world. 
Therefore, the way CEC is done in North America can serve 
only as an example, not a model, for how it might be done 
in other cultures. Nonetheless, I believe common issues ex-
ist in all cultures and that at some level, uncertainty exists 
about how to resolve them-for example, the control of 
medical information and the proper time to forego aggres-
sive life-sustaining treatment. As technology and cultural 
diversity magnifies the areas of uncertainty throughout 
the developed world, CEC may have something to offer.
THE HISTORY OF CEC
We shall see in a later section of this paper that ethics 
committees are not the only, or, necessarily, the best way 
to deliver CEC. But ethics committees were historically 
the first way that grabbed public attention. In the 1960s 
renal dialysis first became widely used in the United States. 
However, there were many more persons with end-stage 
renal failure who were referred to dialysis than there were 
dialysis machines. Dialysis had to be rationed so hospitals 
formed committees to choose who would live and who 
would be allowed to die. Committee members were largely 
white race, men, and upper-middle class. The values that 
guided their decisions, not surprisingly, were ones that, 
by and large, ensured that persons similar to themselves 
would be selected. There was a national outcry about this 
state of affairs. Selection committees were derisively re-
ferred to by the lay press as, “God Squads.” The committees 
ceased to function when the cost of dialysis was covered 
by the government in 1973. But they had introduced the 
American public to the notion of ethics committees in 
hospitals.
The next major public attention to ethics committees came 
in 1976 in the case of Karen Quinlan, a woman in her 20s 
who had suffered severe brain injury and had no likelihood 
of recovery. The case had attracted a great deal of national 
attention because the patient was being kept alive by a 
mechanical ventilator, a new technology at that time. The 
nation had little clinical, legal, or social experience with 
turning off ventilators. Was it illegal? Could people be 
charged and convicted of murder? Or, was it reasonable 
under the circumstances? The national discussion ended 
when the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the parents 
could require physicians and the hospital to turn off the 
ventilator and allow Karen Quinlan to die. In its written 
opinion, the court mentioned that hospital ethics commit-
tees might be helpful in resolving such difficult issues.
At about this time, my own hospital opened its first 
intensive care units in medicine, surgery, pediatrics, and 
neonatology. It became impossible to ignore the question 
of when it was permissible to stop life-sustaining interven-
tions. The directors of these various intensive care units 
got together and decided to form a committee, an ethics 
committee, where they could bring difficult cases for dis-
cussion with knowledgeable colleagues including nurses, 
social workers, and clergy.
By 1981, only about 1 % of hospitals in the United States 
had formed such committees, but the problems of discon-
tinuing life-sustaining treatment were growing in number 
and complexity2. Many cases were taken to court for 
resolution, but the expense in time, energy, money, and 
















In medicine, lawyers began suing physicians who failed 
to inform patients about their options or made damaging 
mistakes in their care. Coincident with this rights move-
ment was the explosion in medical technology. Technology 
dramatically increased control over the timing of death. 
Patients and families began demanding the “right to die” 
by refusing life-sustaining treatment. Health professionals 
and hospitals for the most part resisted, but the judges 
in the court system repeatedly supported the notion that 
patients or their surrogates have a right to determine such 
choices1. If CEC entered hospitals against the will, or at 
least without the support, of most health professionals, it 
did so only because the legal and government regulatory 
system had paved the way. In fact, while many physicians 
and hospitals saw ethics committees as intrusive, they 
found them much less so than malpractice attorneys, 
judges, and government regulators. In cultures where the 
“rights movement” was not so robust or has yet to occur 
at all, resistance to CEC will be greater than it was in the 
United States. We shall see, that even in the United States, 
with its emphasis on patient rights and autonomy, the 
functioning of CEC has been shaped and restricted in ways 
that continue to protect traditional power structures.
CONFLICTING AND SECONDARY ROLES
Modern health care facilities are complicated places that 
face a number of social, economic, legal, and regulatory 
problems. While it is important to recognize and address 
those problems, CEC is not and should not be the primary 
way to deal with them, although some persons may wish 
and others fear that CEC will assume the role of doing so. 
Let us examine some examples.
In the United States concerns about malpractice law suits 
is ubiquitous. Physicians and hospitals are regularly sued 
for malpractice, a tremendous expenditure of time, energy, 
and money. Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that law 
suits are much more likely when there is poor communica-
tion. Since one benefit of CEC is enhanced communication, 
it stands to reason that CEC might reduce the number of 
law suits. I believe it does so, but I reject the notion that 
reduction of law suits (called “risk management’) is the 
primary role of CEC because there are times when doing 
the right thing from a moral perspective may, in fact, not 
mental anguish made such action undesirable. That ethics 
committees might serve as a first alternative for resolving 
disputes was an alternative strongly suggested by a pres-
tigious President’s Commission in the early 1980s. In fact, 
the number of ethics committees increased so that today 
they are estimated to exist in a vast majority of health 
care institutions3. Moreover, the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), which 
accredits hospitals and nursing homes, requires that all 
health care institutions must have formal mechanisms for 
resolving ethical disputes and that these mechanisms be 
explicitly available to patients, families, and health pro-
fessionals. Moreover, hospitals must have written policies 
about ethics-related matters such as turning off life-sus-
taining machines, do-not-resuscitate orders, and informed 
consent to treatment.
Ethics committees and CEC were (and still are) resisted, 
primarily by physicians who viewed them as unwanted 
intrusions into the physician/patient relationship. CEC 
was seen by many as unnecessary at best, and disruptive 
and even seditious at worst. In the face of such strong 
resistance, how then did CEC become so widespread? The 
answer lies in a social movement that coincided with and 
paved the way for CEC.
In the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s there 
was a virtual human rights revolution. This revolution chal-
lenged traditional hierarchical structures of government, 
social institutions (such as schools and hospitals) and hu-
man relations (such as those between teacher and student 
and between physician and patient). It included African 
Americans, women, homosexuals, prisoners, students, 
consumers of various products such as automobiles, and, 
finally, patients. The revolution stressed the importance of 
individual autonomy and the right of individual members 
of society to pursue “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness.” Such a right entailed access to public goods such as 
housing, schools, and jobs, but also the right of individuals 
to information and the control of decisions that affected 
their lives. Often, the full pursuit of such rights challenged 
the authority of police, teachers, physicians, and males 
who had enjoyed special privilege and trust by virtue 
of their professional, racial, or sexual status. Sometimes 
there were demands for financial redress or even criminal 
punishment for what had been “accepted” practice but a 
decade before.


































be the right thing to do from the risk management per-
spective. If we think, and I will so argue, that CEC’s primary 
role is to facilitate doing the morally right thing, it’s pri-
mary goal should never be risk management. In the United 
States, hospitals have entire departments devoted to risk 
management for reasons that are quite understandable. 
But if CEC takes risk management as its primary role, it will 
have little credibility within the institution and society.
Health care facilities, as representative of the larger so-
ciety in which they exist, are also places where truly evil 
things sometimes happen. Patients may be physically or 
sexually abused. The power of physicians in the medi-
cal hierarchy gives them the opportunity to abuse that 
power to take advantage, not only of patients and their 
families, but other health professionals. Such unaccept-
able behavior should be identified, stopped, and guilty 
parties punished, but the role of detective and policeman 
is not suited for CEC. Finding and stopping major moral 
and even criminal problems is the responsibility of institu-
tional administrative structures such as department chair-
men, chiefs of staff, or chief executive officers. Terrible 
breaches of morality and the law need to be investigated 
and stopped, but if those with true power in institutions 
are unwilling or unable to deal with them, CEC certainly 
will not be able to do so.
Indeed, if CEC functions as detective (unilaterally looking 
around for and investigating major moral infractions) and 
policeman (stopping and punishing the perpetrators), it 
will be feared and avoided. The problems best suited to 
CEC are those less dangerous and dramatic issues where 
reasonable people disagree about the right course of ac-
tion and where open discussion, sharing of information, 
and respect for differences are helpful. They are problems 
where people voluntarily seek help. Taking on a detective 
or police function by CEC will ensure that no one asks 
for the help of CEC in resolving everyday moral problems. 
And, no one will want to be associated with it (just as 
few people want their neighbors to see a squad of police-
men visiting their home). In fact, persons doing CEC often 
must convince their potential constituents that they do 
not function as intrusive law enforcement.
The presence of CEC in health care institutions may also 
serve a useful public relations function. If the public is 
concerned about how well their rights will be protected 
in hospitals and nursing homes, the well-advertised pres-
ence of an ethics committee or ethics consultation service 
might be reassuring. This function is a reasonable one, but 
like risk management, should always be secondary. CEC 
should not serve as a moral “cover” while its ability to 
function properly in an institution is, for all intents and 
purposes, non existent.
Persons doing CEC can also do some of the duties of social 
workers (helping families in crisis), persons concerned with 
quality of care, or even cost savings, but I would argue 
that although these secondary roles are sometime helpful, 
there are others persons trained for them specifically. They 
should never be the primary role of CEC.
One function of CEC is to provide moral support and psy-
chological comfort for health professionals facing difficult 
moral decisions. This is a legitimate and useful function, 
but, again, should not be the primary one. There are times 
when it will be the job of CEC to makes health profes-
sionals more uncomfortable by bringing to their attention 
complexities that had been ignored or sidestepped.
Some persons in the United States have argued that CEC 
should function as patient advocate – that is, the primary 
role of ethics committees or consultants should be to 
protect the rights and autonomy of patients. In American 
culture, patient autonomy remains, perhaps, the most 
powerful principle guiding ethical decisions and should 
always take a prominent place in discussions initiated by 
CEC. However, there are other important moral principles 
to be considered, such as beneficence and nonmaleficence 
(the duty to help and not to harm) that in some cases 
are equally or even more relevant to understanding and 
helping. There is certainly a need for patients rights to be 
protected but most hospitals in the United States have 
specifically designated persons to function solely as pa-
tient advocates. Patients may also have access to lawyers 
who can serve that function. Is it not the responsibility 
of every physician, nurse, social worker, and administrator 
to advocate and protect the rights of patients? Moreover, 
rights language tends to be confrontational, demanding, 
and often encourages conflict rather than discussion with 
a view to compromise and resolution.
By making patient advocacy the guiding principle behind 
CEC functioning, we force it into an unrealistic and un-
















wanted role. As we shall see in the next sections, taking 
that role seriously would pit CEC against the political 
power structure of health care institutions and the real 
balance of power in the physician/patient relationships. 
Even if one argues that this structure and balance of power 
should be changed (and it is not clear that most patients 
want this), the role of political revolutionary would render 
CEC even more ineffective and marginalized than that of 
policeman.
As mentioned above, the Report of the American Society 
for Bioethics and Humanities defined the role of CEC as:
a service provided by an individual or a group to help pa-
tients, families, surrogates, health care providers, or other 
involved parties address uncertainty or conflict regarding 
value-laden issues that emerge in health care1.
The Report goes on to advocate an “ethics facilitation 
model” which recognizes that CEC takes place in a culture 
that has two important features. The first is that in the 
United States, as in any culture, there are some clearly 
delineated boundaries between morally acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior. Usually, but not always, these 
boundaries are echoed in the law. The second is that 
we live in a liberal democracy that accepts a plurality 
of values and endorses and, indeed protects, the rights 
of individuals to live by their own moral values. To one 
degree or another, all western democracies share this 
perspective.
Therefore, the Report rejects an “authoritative” role for 
CEC. The ethics consultant should not function as phi-
losopher king, or priest. He/she is not the repository of 
the moral truth or law which can be handed down at the 
expense of the appropriate moral decision makers (patient, 
family, health professionals). But the Report also rejects a 
“pure facilitation” model in which the only goal is to forge 
consensus no matter what the outcome. CEC also has a re-
sponsibility to identify and explain the areas of moral con-
sensus within the society and the institution – for example, 
that a physician may not actively kill a patient or that in 
a Roman Catholic hospital, abortion is not an acceptable 
option. In my culture, CEC has a responsibility to actively 
advocate for the right of competent patients (who so wish) 
to control the decisions about their care. In societies where 
that right was not clearly established, the responsibility to 
advocate for it would be much diminished. It is, of course, 
with very controversial issues or ones where social values 
are in the process of change, that the delineation between 
the role as interpreter of society’s agreed upon values and 
mere facilitator becomes most difficult.
METHOD OF OPERATION AND ACCESS TO CEC
The issue of access to and operation of CEC is where, as 
automobile-crazy Americans like to say, “the rubber hits 
the road.” CEC is least threatening to traditional power 
structures when the case review is retrospective. More 
intrusive is prospective review in which CEC becomes 
actively involved in case before final decisions are made. 
Most CEC done in the United States is prospective.
Another dimension in operation is whether the consulta-
tion is mandatory or voluntary. That is, can the person(s) 
doing CEC decide unilaterally to become involved in a case, 
or should they wait to be invited in. A third dimension 
regards the opinion of the consultant or committee. Is it 
binding, in the sense that patients, families, and health 
professionals must follow it as an order, or is it voluntary, 
they may take or leave it as a recommendation. A system 
that allowed CEC to impose itself and that demanded its 
opinions be obeyed would definitely go against the stream 
and place CEC in the role of detective and policeman or 
judge rejected earlier in this paper. Therefore, almost all 
CEC done in the United States in voluntary in regard to 
both involvement and opinion.
Access to the services of CEC is another controversial issue 
where political reality often takes precedent over ethical 
theory4. There are several levels of access:
1.  Knowledge about the existence and rules governing 
CEC;
2. Ability to request or veto CEC;
3. Notification that CEC is taking place;
4. Ability to participate in CEC;
5.  Awareness of CEC deliberations and recommenda-
tions.


































Extreme patient rights advocates insist that patient and 
families have maximum control of the CEC process while 
traditional, paternalistic physicians claim that only the 
physician “in charge” should control it. In the United 
States, when CEC first entered health care institutions, 
patients, families and health professionals other than 
senior physicians had very little access to and control 
over the CEC process. That has slowly changed but still, 
CEC remains a health professional and, largely, physi-
cian-guided process. This may not coincide with the pure 
idealism of patient rights, but it reflects the changing, but 
not yet fully changed, nature of power relationships and 
expectations in the practice of medicine and the delivery 
of health care.
If patients and their families do not even know of the ex-
istence of CEC in an institution or how it functions, they 
can be effectively excluded from the rest of its functioning. 
If you do not know it exists, you can not request it or insist 
on participating in it and being informed of its outcome.
Who should be allowed to request CEC? Certainly, other 
medical consultations are controlled by the patient’s 
primary physician. Patients rarely if ever directly call in 
cardiologists or surgeons without the participation and 
permission of their primary physician. But CEC is different 
precisely because it often deals with challenges to the 
moral authority of health professionals or institutions by 
patients or their families. If patients do not know that 
a hospital has CEC available and how it works, they are 
being told that they are at best a passive part of the proc-
ess. If patients do not know that an ethics consultation 
is taking place, their right and authority to participate 
in decisions that effect their lives is further attenuated. 
If they are not allowed to request CEC directly, they are 
being further marginalized in a paternalistic system. 
The same is true for nurses and other physicians – for 
example, trainees like residents. If physicians or hospital 
administrators view CEC as performing a detective or 
police function, this is understandable. However, the 
ethics facilitation model insists merely on open discus-
sion, sharing of data, and adherence to clearly delineated 
social norms. Categorical refusal to allow any person with 
a moral stake in the case to participate by requesting, 
joining in the conversation, and being informed about 
the results is a form of moral paternalism unacceptable 
in a liberal democracy.
In fact, although we inform patients and families about 
the availability of CEC, patients rarely ask for it, although, 
in my institution, residents and nurses do so frequently. 
We always ask patients, families, and other medical staff 
if they have discussed the problem and the request for 
CEC with the attending physician (the physician ultimately 
responsible for the case) and, if they have not, suggest 
they do so before we become involved. We do not want 
to provide an easy avoidance of direct and constructive 
discussion within the health care team. When they initi-
ate the conversation, the need for CEC often disappears. 
Attending physicians, when asked, have rarely refused the 
consultation. When they do so, it has always represented 
a worrisome breakdown in communication between health 
professionals or between the physician and the patient. 
Such breakdowns are better managed by risk managers, 
patient advocates, or the administrative structure of 
the hospital, groups that have primary responsibility for 
these matters and clear authority and power to deal with 
them.
Each institution and each society that uses CEC will 
have to strike the right balance about the access issue, 
a balance that must take into account the prevailing 
moral consensus about the rights of patients, families, 
and other members of the health care team as well as the 
structure of power in that particular setting. As the society 
or institutional culture evolves, changes can be instituted 
that reflect this evolution. Forcing issues is rarely, if ever, 
successful in this context.
HOW IS CEC BEST ACCOMPLISHED-BY COMMITTEE, 
SMALL TEAMS, OR INDIVIDUAL ETHICS CONSULTANTS?
In the United States, CEC has been and continues to be 
performed in three distinct ways – by committee, by small 
teams, and by individual consultants. Each method has its 
own advantages and disadvantages5.
Ethics committees are, perhaps, the best known. Tradition-
ally, ethics committees include representatives of various 
professions within the health care setting such as physi-
cians, nurses, social workers, hospital lawyers, clergy and, 
often, one or two representatives from the lay public. Of 
course, early in their evolution, many ethics committees 
















included only physicians, but that has largely changed. 
Most often, ethics committees function like an administra-
tive body. They meet only one time, hear clinical and social 
data presented most often by the attending physician sup-
plemented by other health professionals and make their 
recommendations at that single meeting to be included in 
the medical record or shared with the patient and family 
at the discretion of the attending physician. Critics of this 
method point out that ethics committees are not “user 
friendly.” For example, it is difficult to get a group of busy 
people together for a meeting at short notice. The formal 
nature of a committee meeting with a room full of people 
can be intimidating, making it less likely that people will 
call or participate in a meeting. This is particularly true for 
patients and families who are likely to feel overwhelmed 
by a room full of strangers. Ethics committee members 
obtain information second or third hand and have little or 
no opportunity to gather more information if it is needed. 
Some people have cautioned that responsibility will be 
diffused when it rests with a group of people and that 
committee deliberations will lead to “groupthink” – the 
tendency of groups to seek agreement rather than take 
on difficult issues.
Proponents of ethics committees argue that committees 
are more likely to fulfill the democratic ideal of ethics 
facilitation because many values and points of view will be 
represented by multiple committee members as opposed 
to an individual consultant, who may be more prone to 
act like a philosopher king, imposing his or her unique 
values.
Ethics committees also give more institutional “ownership” 
to ethics problems and their solutions rather than vesting 
them in one expert. Education about the ethical problems 
in the institution is also more widespread when commit-
tees are involved.
Proponents of individual ethics consultants point out how 
much more user friendly they are. A single consultant is 
much more available for informal or emergency consulta-
tion. He or she can gather relevant facts directly from the 
medical record and conversations with the relevant parties 
– patients, families, and health professionals. Because of 
its more informal nature, CEC done by individuals can more 
naturally involve patients and families in the process. CEC 
is an ongoing process, it is argued, not a single event. An 
individual consultant can collect data over time, revisit 
conversations after more information becomes available 
and get important parties together for discussion and 
conflict resolution whenever necessary. Committees tend 
to conduct their business in a single meeting. A single 
consultant is visible to all concerned and can write a note 
directly in the patient record, allowing maximum account-
ability. In my own experience, when our hospital went from 
the committee to the individual consultant model, the 
number of consults requested increased by 700 %!
The major criticism of the individual consultant has been 
mentioned above – e.g., the danger of imposing the idi-
osyncratic values of the consultants and promoting the il-
lusion that a single person, rather than everyone in the in-
stitution, has both important knowledge and responsibility 
concerning optimum moral decision making. In addition, 
individual consultants should have considerable expertise 
and experience, something not available in many institu-
tional settings or communities.
A small team, consisting, for example, of a physician, 
nurse, and social worker is a third choice. A small team 
can have the best of both worlds – the virtues of quick 
response, direct gathering of data, more than one point of 
view, and clear accountability.
In my view, the best choice, if possible, is performing 
CEC with a small team in conjunction with a full ethics 
committee. For example, a team of three persons could 
do the consults and present them retrospectively to the 
full committee at a regularly scheduled monthly meeting. 
This would offer the opportunity for peer review, greater 
institutional ownership of CEC and education for commit-
tee members not involved in the original consult. In cases 
where the team felt uncomfortable, it could request an 
emergency meeting of the full committee for prospective 
review of the case. Committee members could rotate their 
service as members of the smaller team, allowing for even 
greater involvement and education.
CONCLUSION
CEC is a relatively new endeavor that has been largely 
limited to North America where it has been shaped by 


































that region’s unique legal, social, and cultural charac-
teristics and development. This experience might serve 
as example but should not provide an exact model for 
CEC in other countries or cultures. In this essay, I have 
attempted to set out some of the operational charac-
teristics of and choices facing CEC in the United States 
of America. I do believe that whatever the culture or 
community, modern high-technology medicine poses dif-
ficult value choices. Whatever, the nature of information 
sharing and decision making, some people in the system 
struggle to do the right thing when they are not sure 
exactly what that is. In liberal, pluralistic democracies, 
the answers can not come from religious or political 
authorities. They must be the result of public discussion, 
education, and compromise. To this end, CEC can make 
an important contribution.
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